PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As

MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.

ADMINISTRATORS.

In Karns Adnzr. v. Seaton, 62 S. W. 737, it appeared that
an administrator turned over to his wife as her share of the
estate, notes which belonged to the estate. This
Recovery
was alleged to be a wasting of assets, and an
of
Wasted Assets administrator de bonis non, who had been subsequently appointed, sued to recover these notes. The trial
court sustained his action, but on appeal to the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky the decision of the lower court was
reversed, it being held that under such circumstances the
right to recover wasted assets is in the distributees, not in
the administrator de bonis non.
BANKS.

The Appellate Court of Indiana holds in Neal v. First
National Bank of Lebanon, 6o N. E. 164, that where a
husband learns that his wife has forged checks
Payment
on his bank account, which have been paid, and
of
Forged Check he examines the checks and pass book but fails
to make any complaint to the bank, the latter is not liable to
the husband for the payment of future checks forged by the
wife. The principle upon which the court bases its decision
is that the depositor, by failing to complain, makes the forger
his agent, for the reason that he owes some duty as a depositor to the bank, and his failure to warn them upon his
discovery of the forgery estops him from recovering for the
payment of future forged checks, which the bank might not
have paid but for his laches.
An owner of shares in a national bank sold the same in
good faith when the bank was insolvent, without knowledge
or reason to believe that it was so. He did
Transfer of
Stock; Bank everything that was reasonably possible to have
the transfer made on the books of the bank. In
Insolvent
such a case, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
(Third Circuit) holds such transferring shareholder can no
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longer be regarded as such, nor held liable to an assessment
made by the comptroller upon the subsequent closing of the
bank as insolvent, though the evidence showed that the bank
was in fact insolvent at the time the sale was made, and
that the purchaser also was insolvent: Earle v. Carson, lO7,
Fed.

639.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

In Co-operative Building and Loan Association v. State,
6o N. E. 146, the Supreme Court of Indiana holds that a
nrSeonable
Searches

constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches is not violated by a statute giving tax

officials the right to examine books and papers

of taxpayers for the purpose of properly listing and assessing property for taxation. Such searches, says the court,
are not unreasonable and the right to make them may be
enforced by mandamus.
Against the dissent of three justices (Harlan, White and
McKenna), the United States Supreme Court holds in
French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 21 Supreme Ct. Rep. 625, that the apportionment of
for Paving
the entire cost of a street pavement upon the
abutting lots according to their frontage, without any preliminary hearing as to benefits, may be authorized by the
legislature, and this will not constitute a taking of property
without due process of law. The opinion of the court
delivered by Mr. Justice Shiras, it need hardly be said, is
an exhaustive review of the law upon this subject.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts holds in
In re Storti, 6o N. E. 210, that the statute of the state providing for the execution by electricity of crimCruel or
inals found guilty of a capital offence, does not
Unusual
Punishments violate the constitutional prohibition of the state
against the infliction of cruel or unusual punishment. The
punishment, says the court, is death; the electricity is only
the means to accomplish this ancient punishment and does
so in a manner lessening, instead of prolonging the pain of
death. In answer to the argument that under this theory,
a slow fire might be used to accomplish the end as well as the
electric current, the court says that in such case the means
would have not only the object of producing death, but for
the purpose of causing other and additional pain.
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In order to enable the prosecutor to identify a prisoner, an
officer took the former to the jail, and while the prisoner
Compelling

was confined put on her head a certain hat.
holds, is not compelling the prisoner to testify

This, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas

against herself while confined in jail, and the prosecutor
may testify to the identification which these circumstances
enable him to make: White v. State, 62 S. W. 749.
CONTEMPT.

A judgment of conviction in a contempt proceeding,
which recites the facts on which the conviction is based is
Review of
proceings

not conclusive as to such facts in a habeas corpus

proceeding, but the falsity thereof may be
shown: Ex parte Duncan, 62 S. W. 758 (Court

of Criminal Appeals of Texas). One judge dissents regarding the decision a "radical departure" in the jurisprudence
of the state, going further than any other case, and seriously
affecting the power of the court to maintain its own dignity
and authority.
CONTRACTS.

A contract was entered into between B. and the warden
of the state prison of Michigan by which the warden agreed
to furnish B. with the labor of three hundred
Convict
convicts at a stated price per day. A., while
Labor
a convict, was required by the warden to work
for B., and B. paid the state the contract price for his labor.
After A.'s discharge from prison he sued B. for the value of
his work. In Thomson v. Bronk, 85 N. W. 1O84, the Supreme Court of Michigan holds that he cannot recover, on
the ground that even though his commitment to prison were
void, he has no contract relations, express or implied, with B.
CONTRIBUTION.

In Boutin v. Etsell, 85 N. W. 964, there had been eleven
sureties on a defaulting county treasurer's bond. Four of
Compromise
Surety's
Liability

them effected a compromise of a judgment on

the bond against all, and settled with the county.
Upon these facts the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided that they can recover from a fifth his proportionate share of the amount paid in settlement, though
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they had not paid more than their proportion of the original
judgment, holding that upon this point the law has undergone modification from its original form.
CORPORATIONS.

The Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee -holds in
Lellyett v. Brooks, 62 S. W. 596, that where a corporation
Stock
permits the cancellation of a stock subscription,
Subscptons

it and its assignee in insolvency are estopped

to sue thereon. Creditors existing at the time, and still
unpaid, are the only ones who can sue on such subscriptions.
The president and teller of a bank who were large stockholders in it agreed that the president should endeavor to
secure the co-operation of other stockholders or
Contract
to
control of sufficient stock to secure the election
Control
of a board of directors satisfactory to them, and
electlon
who would continue them in their respective
offices. The expense of securing such control was to be
shared equally by them. After the president had incurred
expense, and secured control of stock which together with
that already owned by the parties gave them control of the
corporation, the teller defeated the plan by selling his stock.
The president thereupon brought suit for the expenses he
had incurred, but the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas denies
recovery, on the ground that, while it is legal for a majority
of stockholders to combine and control the election of the
board of directors and management of the corporation, a
contract is not legal "if it provides that a lucrative position
shall be given to one or more of the parties to the contract":
Withers v. Edwards, 62 S. W. 795.
DAMAGES.

In an action for damages caused by injuries to the plaintiff's wife, the value of the husband's services in attending
on his wife must be measured by the value of
'leasure

services of a competent nurse and not by the

time lost from his business pursuits: Howells v. North
American Transportation and Trading Co., 64 Pac. 786
(Supreme Court of Washington).
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The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Fourth Department), holds in Stowell v. Manufacturers'
Agent

and Merchants' Insurance Company of Pittsburg, 70 N. Y. Supp. 8o, that an insurance

agent, whose contract is wrongfully terminated
by the company, is entitled to damages for prospective commissions on business he might have done if the contract had
not been broken. One judge (McLennan) dissents, assigning, however, no reasons.

In an action to recover damages for failure to give possession of leased property, the measure of damages is the dif,ease:Failure ference between the leased rental value and the
to
rent reserved, where the premises were necesOie
sary to the plaintiff for the purpose of carrying
Possession
I
on a new business, since there could be no basis
on which to estimate the profits: Engstrom v. Merrial, 64
Pac. 914 (Supreme Court of Washington).
DURESS.

A husband conveyed to his wife land worth more than her
inchoate right of dower in all his lands, in consideration of
A.Pdg

her agreement to release her dower rights in any

lands of his, when requested, without further
consideration. Subsequently, he being in press-

ing need of funds, his wife in order to take an advantage
of his necessities, refused to release her dower rights in certain lands which he wished to sell in order to raise funds,
unless he would convey to her certain other lands. The
husband yielded under the pressure of circumstances. Upon
these facts the New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First Department), holds that the latter deed to her
was procured by duress and should be set aside: Van Dyke
v. Wood, 70 N. Y. Supp. 324.

Two of the five judges dis-

sent.
EASEMENTS.

Against the dissent of two judges the New York Supreme
Court (Appellate Division, First Department), holds in
AfterAquired
Title

Farley v. Howard, 70 N. Y. Supp. 51, that

where the owner of a lot erects a building
thereon with the stoop extending by mistake on
an adjoining lot, of which he was an owner in common,
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and he then sells the house and lot and afterwards acquires
title in severalty in the adjoining lot, such acquisition does
not create an easement, entitling the owner of the first lot to
maintain the stoop on the second.
Muir v. Cox, 62 S. W. 723 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky), decides that each of the several parcels of land
Partition: . allotted in a partition proceeding is subject to
the benefits and burdens of existing passways as
Implied
Reservations between it and the other parcels, though there
be no reference to the passways in the deeds of partition;
and that a subsequent purchaser of a part of one of the lots
takes it subject to an existing passway between it and that
part of the lot retained by the vendor.
EVIDENCE.

The line between what facts an attorney may and what
he may not be compelled to disclose, is drawn in the case of
Attorney
and
Client

United States v. Lee, 107 Fed. 702, where the

United States Circuit Court (E. D. New York)
holds that where an accused person admitted to
bail could not be found, and on investigation by the grand
jury it appeared that his counsel was not retained by the
accused, but by some person acting for the accused, or in his
interest, the counsel might be compelled to disclose the
name and residence or usual place of abode of such person,
but not the interest such person had in the matter.
FELLOW-SERVANTS.

A. was injured while tearing down some brick walls at
the California State Insane Asylum, by the alleged negligence of some of the inmates, who were working with him as fellow-servants. The inmates
Duty
to
allowed to work were selected by subordinate
select
officers appointed by the superintendent of the
Competent
Fellowinstitution. A., the plaintiff, in order to recover
servants:
Insanity
in spite of the fellow-servant rule, claimed that
the employment of such fellow-servants was an
act of negligence, and a violation of the substantive duty to
employ competent fellow-servants owed by the master to
his employes. The Supreme Court of California holds in
Atkinson v. Clark, 64 Pac. 772, that in the absence of
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further evidence than the mere insanity of the workmen,
the superintendent is not liable. "There can be no presumption," says the court, "that the inmates were dangerous or
unskillful from the fact alone that they were insane."
FIXTURES.

In Solomon v. Staiger, 48 Ati. 996, the Court of Errors
and Appeals of New Jersey holds .that where fixtures have
been constructively severed from the freehold
Sale of
(in this case by a bill of sale), but their physical
Freehold
annexation is permitted by the purchaser of the realty and of
the fixtures to remain undisturbed, the execution by such
purchaser, of a subsequent conveyance of the realty, not
referring to the fixtures either by way of transfer or of
reservation, is a constructive reannexation of the fixtures
to the freehold, and makes them a part thereof.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in deciding the
case of Foote v. Nickerson, 48 Atl. io88, reviews at length
the law relating to a greements for separation
between husband and wife. The opinion is an
Agreement
for
excellent review of this branch of the law, and
Separation:
supports the holding of the court that a contract
Entire
between a husband and wife, which provides
Contract
that they shall live separately and which releases their claims on the property of each other both before
and after death, is an entire contract, and being void as to
the separation, does not bar the interest of the husband in the
estate of the wife.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

In Indiana a statute, not unlike that of some other states,
authorizes an action against a person unlawfully selling or
cit
Act: Damage
Loss of

furnishing liquors by any person injured
thereby. The extent to which this liability is

Support

carried by the courts appears in Homire v. Holfman, 6o N. E. 154, where the Supreme Court of

Indiana holds that a saloon keeper who sells liquors to an
intoxicated person (an unlawful act by statute), by which
the latter becomes so crazed that he commits a homicide,
and is sent to the penitentiary, is liable for loss of support
by the wife of the intoxicated person.
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LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Where a tenant holds over after a lease for eleven months,
he becomes liable for another term of the same length, says
Hoeng

the New York Supreme Court (Trial Court,
Kings County) in Ketcham v. Ochs, 7o N. Y.

Supp. 268, laying it down as a general principle

that the holding over is presumed to be for the same term
as the original lease. But such holding over must be voluntary or wrongful to have this effect and therefore where a
subtenant of premises demised under a lease expiring on the
last day of April removed on the morning of May I all his
property except certain mortgaged chattels which he abandoned on the afternoon of the same day to the chattel mortgagee, with the key of the premises, and in consequence of
the fact that this mortgage retained the key until the
fifteenth of May, the landlord did not get possession until
then, the tenant is not liable for a new term on the ground
of holding over.

LEGITIMACY.

Where a wife secures a divorce, according to the laws of
the place where domiciled, and thereafter marries another,
to whom a child is born, such child is legitimate
Divorce:
everywhere, though such divorce and remarRemarriage
riage may not be recognized as legal elsewhere:
In re Hall, 7o N. Y. Supp. 406 (N. Y. Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, Third Department).

LIBEL.

A. sued B. for the publication of a charge that he, A., had
entered a house and had stolen property therefrom. The
Verdict

Public PoIcy

jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding

him substantial compensatory damages. This
verdict the New York Supreme Court (Trial

Ter, Kings County) sets aside in O'Connor v. Press Pub.
Co., 70 N. Y. Supp. 367, on the ground of public policy,
since the evidence showed that though he had not entered
the house in question for the purpose of larceny, he had
entered it for the purpose of committing the crime of statutory rape on an infant daughter of the owner.
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The Court of Appeals of Kentucky holds in Lancasterv.
Wolff, 62 S. W. 717, that where one of two joint owners
of property, who has a lien upon the interest
Property o f the other, procures a sale of the property for
partition, he may enforce his lien against the
proceeds of the property, though he waived his lien upon the
property by failing to assert it in the suit for partition.

LIMITATIONS.

A testator died, and his devisees entered into possession
of his real estate before judgment was rendered against the
testator's executors on a note executed by the
Debts of
testator. Judgment was afterwards obtained
Decedent:
Enforcement in the probate court establishing the judgment
as a claim against the estate and an execution
Against
Deviaces
was issued and returned nulla bona. Upon these

facts the Supreme Court of South Carolina holds in Brock v.
Kirkpatrick, 38 S. E. 779, that the statute of limitations
commences to run against a suit to enforce the judgment
against the land in possession of the devisees on the date of
the return of the execution and not when the cause of action
accrued on the note.
A right of action to enforce the individual liability of
stockholders for debts of a corporation, where such liability
is created by statute, does not accrue till the
Stockholders' creditor has exhausted his remedy against the
corporation, though the liability accrues when
Liability:
Part
the debt is incurred. Therefore, the Supreme
Payment
Court of Rhode Island holds the statute of limitations begins to run from the former date: Kilton v. Providence Tool Co., 48 Atl. io39. The court further holds in
this case that where the president of an insolvent corporation, with the assent of its stockholders, turns over its business and assets to a committee of its creditors, for the purpose of disposing of all assets and dividing them among
creditors, a payment of a dividend by such committee to a.
creditor, does not constitute such a new promise by the corporation as will avoid the statute of limitations.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

With one judge dissenting the New York Supreme Court
(Appellate Division, Third Department) holds in Dennis v.
Village of Elmira Heights, 70 N. Y. Supp. 312,
Private
that where a driveway, apparently, though not
Ways
in fact, a public highway, is commonly used by
the public, and a municipality in the exercise of its right of
improving an intersecting street, leaves the approach to the
driveway in a dangerous condition, the duty of the municipality to the public requires its exercise of reasonable care
to prevent accidents which might reasonably be anticipated
to those traveling on the road with due care, and in ignorance of the danger, and renders it liable for injuries occasioned by failure to exercise such care. The dissent is
based upon the proposition that the circumstances do not
impose such duty upon the municipality.
NUISANCE.

The charter of the city of Portland, Oregon, authorized
the city to protect the health of the city and remove nuisances
and to declare what should constitute the same.
Burial
of
Under this grant of authority the city council
the Dead
declared generally that the burial of a dead body
in any part of the city would constitute a nuisance. In
Wygant v. McLouchlan, 64 Pac. 867, the Supreme Court of
Oregon holds this regulation not authorized by the grant
in the charter, on the ground that the burial of a human body
is not per se a nuisance and cannot be made so by the declaration of the municipality and, it appearing that interment
might be made in certain sections of the city without giving
offence to any human sense or endangering the health of the
city, it is held that the city council overeached its granted
power.
PARTIES.

In Scholle v. Metropolitan Elevated Railway Co. 69 N.
Y. Supp. 1118, it appeared that property had been sold pending an action by the owner against the elevated
Sale
Pending
railway company for obstructing the owner's
Action
right to light and air in the use of the property,
and to enjoin a continuance of the obstruction. The trial
court thereupon made an order that the grantees be made
co-plaintiffs. On appeal by the defendants the New York
Supreme Court (Appellate Division, First Department)
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reversed this action, holding that the grantees were not entitled to be made co-plaintiffs, on the ground that their presence was unnecessary to protect any of their interests, One
judge, Judge Ingraham, dissents, assigning as one reason
that multiplicity of suits would thus be avoided.
PENAL BOND.

The Supreme Court of North Carolina holds that a judgment on a penal bond in excess of the prescribed penalty,
though computed by taking a principal sum
Interest
within the penalty and adding interest thereon
from the time of the breach of the bond, is not authorized at
common law, nor by any statute of the state: New Home
Sewing Machine Co., v. Scago, 38 S. E. 805. One judge
dissents on the ground that "the penalty of the bond is payable because the principal did not fulfill his obligation, The
interest is the penalty upon the sureties [the action here was
against the sureties] for not fulfilling theirs," that is, their
duty to pay promptly.
PLED GE.

In an action where personal property was pawned for a
usurious rate of interest, no right to retain the same as collateral security for the loan accrued to the
Usury
pledgee, and the pledger was entitled to recover
the value of the property: Scott v. Reid, 85 N. W. IO12
(Supreme Court of Minnesota).
RAILROADS.

A railway company, having constructed its station and a
platform incident thereto, does not by permitting persons to
use such platform for purposes of their own, not
Platform
Injury

connected with the transaction of business at

such station, become charged with a duty to
reconstruct guard, or light such platform so as
to render it safe for the permitted use: Cincinnati,H. & D. R. Co. v. Aller, 6o N4 E. 205 (Supreme Court
of Ohio). The case of Harriman v. Railway Co., 12 N. E.
45, 45 Ohio St., was urged upon the court as leading to a
different conclusion, but it is distinguished on the ground
that in that case a change in the mode of operating the road
added "a new and further peril to such permitted use without
taking precaution against injuries which would naturally
result therefrom."
to

Licensee
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REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

In Harlanv. Central Phosphate Co., 62 S. W. 614, the
facts showed that a half interest in common in a lot
descended to A., who supposed, under a misMistake
of
take as to the law of descent, which was also
Law:
shared by B., that the lot descended in severalty
Innocent

Purchaser

to the latter who inherited no interest therein.

Insolvency
of

a mistake of the draftsman, conveyed only a

Each of the parties owned adjoining, and thereafter they executed a joint mineral lease to several descending tracts owned by them in severalty, which included the
lot in question. The lease was executed as a joint lease
merely for convenience, and all the parties, including the
lessee, supposed that A. had no interest in the lot in question, though they all knew the facts. Under these circumstances the Court of Chancery Appeals of Tennessee holds
that the lease did not convey the interest of A. in such lot
since it was executed under a mutual mistake as to the ownership thereof. But the lessee having transferred the lease
to a third person, who knew nothing of the facts, the court
refuses to reform the deed against such transferee, on the
ground that the transferee was entitled to rely on the execution of the lease by A.
While a corporation was insolvent, a mortgage was given
by it to prefer some of its existing creditors. This, though
life estate in its real property. After the corporation had been adjudged insolvent and a
receiver appointed to wind up its affairs, application was
made to the court to reform the instrument so as to express the intention of the parties. This application was
granted by the trial court, but on appeal the Court of Errors
and Appeals of New Jersey holds this error, it appearing
that the mortgages had not acted to their detriment on the
supposition that the mortgage conveyed the fee: Miller v.
Mortgagor

Savage, 48 Atl.

1OO4.

REPLEVIN BOND.

InHenderson-Achert Lithographic Co. v. fohn Shillito
Co., 6o N. E. 295, the Supreme Court of Ohio holds that
sureties on an undertaking in replevin have no
Rights
of
remedy at law or in equity upon a contract to
sureties
indemnify them against loss on account of their
suretyship until such loss has occurred; nor has the defen-
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dant in the replevin suit who recovered a judgment therein,
though the sureties and judgment debtor be insolvent and
the judgment be otherwise uncollectible. The Chief Justice dissents.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

A promise by one person to indemnify another for becomlndemnity

ing surety upon the bond of a third is not within
the statute of frauds, and will support an action,

although not in writing: Hartley v. Sandford, 48 Atl. ioo9
(Supreme Court of New Jersey).
TESTAMENTARY TRUSTEES.

In O'Brien v. Jackson, 6o N. E. 238, it appeared that
executors and testamentary trustees contracted for repairs
to buildings devised to them in trust, the will

having authorized them to make such repairs.
However, the Court of Appeals of New York
holds that they are not liable in an action at law therefor in
a representative capacity, to recover such amount, stating
as a general principle that an executory contract entered into
by executors or testamentary trustees for the benefit of the
estate upon a new consideration does not bind the estate,
nor create any liability not founded on the contract of the
testator.
Contrats,

TRUSTS.

The Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Rollins v.
Merrill,48 Atl. io88, takes for granted that a legacy for the
permanent care of a cemetery lot is for a charitable use, and therefore upholds it. The Court
Charitable
of Chancery of New Jersey reaches a different
Use
conclusion in In re Corle, 48 Atl. 1027, holding such a legacy vioid as not being for a charitable use, and therefore
violating the rule against perpetuities.
WATERS AND WATER COURSES.

A. was the owner of certain land through which a
stream of water ran, the waters of which he used for irrigating.

There was a natural depression in the

bank above his land, over which water flowed to
B.'s land when the stream was high. Within
two or three years channels had been cut through this deIrrsaion:
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pression, so that a material portion of the stream at all times
flowed to B.'s land, leaving A. an insufficient supply of
water. It did not appear whether the channels were cut by
natural or artificial means. Under these circumstances the
Supreme Court of Oregon holds in Cox v. Banard, 64 Pac.
86o, that, however the facts may be as to this last point, in
either case, whether the channels were cut by natural or
artificial forces, A. is entitled to restore and maintain the
banks of the stream in their normal condition.
In Jones v. Conn, 64 Pac. 855, this same court holds that
where defendant owned land bordering on a stream and subsequently acquired under different grants lands
pan
adjacent thereto, but which were not contiguLa
ous to the stream, the lands subsequently purchased were riparian, and that where part of the defendant's
land bordered on the stream the fact that part of it extended
beyond the naturalwatershed of the stream did not prevent
that part from being riparian land. Hence it is decided ihat
a use of the water of the stream on such land will not be
enjoined so long as it does not materially injure the plaintiffs.
WILLS.
The New York Supreme Court (Appellate Division,
Second Department), in In re Austin's Will, 69 N. Y. Supp.
1036, holds that where a will directs the income
Income
of
of testator's property to be paid to certain perEste
sons for life, remainder over, the life tenants,
and not the estate, are entitled to the first year's income.
Proceeding on this principle the court decides that the
executor and trustee cannot pay all the income to the life
tenants and collect their commissions from the principal of
the estate, but must make the two funds share the burden
together.

